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MAHLER TO MACH 1 
 
Capt. John Gadzinski 
Four Winds Consulting 
Virginia Beach, VA 
 
As a classically trained musician who studied with the Boston Symphony and worked for 
the Opera Company of Boston, the author was able to directly apply the skills used in the 
high pressure world of professional music performance to become a Navy fighter pilot 
with 10 years of service and 321 carrier landings. Later, after flying for a major airline 
and completing his certificate in Aviation Safety at USC, the author worked with the 
NTSB on major accident investigations and started to observe the link between aviation 
human factors, safety analysis, and the similarities between accident investigation skills 
and the skill needed for professional musicians. This presentation will discuss topics 
including how data in both music and in safety management systems can be heavily 
influenced by training and talent, and the striking similarities in the skills used. Other 
topics include human performance and how music auditions and carrier landings share 
identical mental modeling, how error management and non normal operations are treated 
in both fields and how the functioning of a chamber orchestra can serve as a model for 
cockpit situational awareness and CRM. The presentation shows how classical music and 
aviation safety relate in unique and fascinating ways. 
When the World Changes 
The Apollo I fire was a tragedy so unexpected and the consequences so unimaginable that it shook the 
country to its core. Three national heroes were killed in a matter of seconds, only feet away from a crew 
helpless to do anything. The exercise itself was no more than a dress rehearsal meant to have about as 
much risk as an evening in front of the television. The political aftermath was equally brutal. The year 
was 1968 and in front of the US Senate Apollo astronaut Frank Borman was trying to keep the effort to 
go to the moon alive.  
Amazingly the best and brightest minds of the day couldn’t foresee what would have been obvious to any 
high school physics teacher: placing three men in a metal container, clamped shut and filled with 100% 
pressurized oxygen while throwing hundreds of electrical switches and packed full of flammable plastic 
was a sure recipe for disaster.  The consequences of just one small spark would be catastrophic. And yet 
that disaster occurred. When asked why this was allowed to happen, the answer was straightforward and 
eloquent, Borman replied: “a failure of imagination.” Even though safety”, he said, “was never 
intentionally compromised …no one ever imagined [a fire] could have happened on the ground. If anyone 
would have thought of it the test would have been classified as hazardous…but it wasn’t, we just didn’t 
think of it.”  
You don’t need to be in NASA to have decisions about risk affect you. We live in a world defined by risk 
and the rewards that taking them bring to us. We call it a business approach for preventing unnecessary 
cost and everyone from your local school to airline pilots try to imagine the best way to keep all of us free 
from the kinds of consequences we feel unable to afford. Why then do failures occur? In recent years 
 
we’ve had professional pilots crash airplanes, one of the largest and most advanced oil platforms blow up, 
and see established financial institutions fail and threaten to take the entire country down with them,  just 
to name a few. In each case we ask the same questions as the Senate Panel for Apollo 1; why someone, 
anyone, didn’t see it coming? We ponder this despite the fact that the data available to us has increased 
exponentially. The problem is obviously not our lack of data.   
Analyzing the present flood of information and imagining the risks it represents in our complex world 
takes as much training and skill as it does the Boston Symphony when they look at the data (musical 
notes) given to them. The only difference is that the symphony is composed of people highly trained, 
mentally disciplined, possessing the background knowledge, analysis techniques, and communication 
skills necessary to pull immense meaning from raw notes and present them in the most effective way 
possible. The people responsible for safety most likely are not so prepared.  For both the musician and the 
airline pilot the question is fundamentally the same: “what turns information into knowledge and 
knowledge into relevance?”  
This question started to appear when I was part of a lengthy investigation with the NTSB. The data was 
there in black and white and yet two extremely smart people looked at the same information and came to 
completely different conclusions. In this case it was the Joint Winter Runway Friction Program conducted 
in collaboration by NASA, the FAA, and Transport Canada. Coming out of this research the US and 
Canada developed two different guidelines concerning what the hazards were and how best to effectively 
deal with them. The Canadian’s used a friction index that managed both uncertainty and measurable 
components. The US relied on pilot reports alone.  Both were correct from the standpoint of their 
respective reasoning, so how could one have contributed to the accident but still be viewed as a valid 
conclusion contributing to safety? Could a risk lay not in what was answered but in the question?  
When looked at in hindsight it became clear that there were two visions of “risk” being used. One was 
engineering and legal risk, the other was an operational risk. The engineering approach sought to 
eliminate randomness in favor of the most direct path towards what could be considered a consistent 
correlation between observations and performance. The operational approach sought to minimize 
engineering variables through equipment standardization and embrace the possibility of corrupt data 
(randomness) as a variable that itself had to be identified. The data itself didn’t point to one approach over 
the other. Instead it was the interpretation of the individuals themselves that played such a large part in 
defining hazards and mitigations. This was not the first time a scenario like this has been played out.  
One of the more famous quotes came from the Space Shuttle Challenger accident when a Morton Thiokol 
manager pointedly told someone to “take their engineers hat off and put their manager’s hat on.” It’s not 
that people were intending to cut corners on safety; they just couldn’t imagine what was around those 
corners. And even if they did, can a hazard reside not only in a potential event but also in someone’s 
ability to communicate risk effectively?  
In the Senate Panel on Apollo I, Frank Borman was saying that at the time the people involved in the 
process didn’t have the skills to see how much meaning lay embedded  in what was before them.  What 
was put down on paper as a testing protocol was actually a treasure map for the many interconnected 
perspectives that a story about risk could possibly contain. It was if the people involved were reading a 
book called “Moby Dick” purely for guidance on how to look for whales with no expectations that it 
 
could be talking about anything else. Borman was an engineer and pilot, but his observations were in fact 
more a reference to art.  
You see what your knowledge tells you and when that knowledge changes, what you see changes. When 
looking at the dawn it makes just as much sense to think that the sun goes around the Earth as it does the 
other way around. We only see that it that way because over time we’ve asked the kind of questions that 
changed our knowledge in the first place. As for the orbit of the sun, the question that first leads to the 
theory of planetary motion was: “On what day should we celebrate our religious holidays?” Knowing 
what day it was and how to accurately predict what planet will appear in the sky then lead to Copernicus 
and a major re-shuffling of our view of the sky. To the church, the question of risk was a political one. 
How can you run a religion without having some concrete direction on when to do things? Of course what 
they got in the end was more of a headache than they bargained for.  
Today we look at risk from perspectives we chose and sometimes end up with unintended results just like 
the church did. They come from different viewpoints on what is important such as from lawyers worried 
about legal risk, from elected officials worried about political risk, from managers worried about financial 
risk, and from almost everybody worried about social risk. Will any of those people, the lawyers, 
accountants, bosses, or politicians be worried about the risk of someone’s “failure of imagination?” To 
them there is scant room for imagination because their world is carefully defined by variables that set the 
boundaries of what is acceptable and not.  
Let us now look at how musicians ask questions and about how not only their perspective changes but 
how they expect and want their perspective to change. In fact, if a musician looks at a series of notes and 
doesn’t find some change in perspective it is deemed downright unprofessional! 
Anyone with a child in a school band knows what an 8th grade concert sounds like. Now take that same 
piece of music and give it to the Boston Symphony and it’ll probably sound a lot different. You pay good 
money to go to the movies where they employ a top orchestra to play a soundtrack, whereas you’d feel 
much differently if some high school band gave the score their best shot. In my experience, company 
safety briefs and professional safety conferences are a lot like 8th grade concerts. The people who attend 
are there because they should be there, whether they get anything out of it is up for debate.  
To understand how meaning is extracted out of data and presented in a way that is both science and art we 
first look at the Navy Pilot out at sea.  
Music and the Pilot  
The carrier landing and the concert stage have many facets in common. First, they are both very much 
dependant on the mental state of the performer to bring his skills to bear.  Unlike the landing on normal 
runway, the carrier landing is always performed in front of a knowledgeable and critical audience. Every 
landing on the carrier is graded, de-briefed in person, and posted for all to see. Every landing is also 
broadcast over TV through the entire ship as one of the channels available for general viewing. The 
landing requires an ability to repeat a skill that has been practiced beforehand and to do so under stressful 
conditions for not only he being watched but there is a very real possibility that if done incorrectly, he 
may not survive.  
 
While for the musician physical survival is rarely at stake, the mental demands are almost exactly similar. 
For such an event the preparation is accomplished using a multi-step process.  First, a large amount of 
repetition is employed to create a subconscious relationship between mind and body coordination for the 
skills required. This is first and foremost a physical learning process. Then the musician will employ what 
is known as technical rehearsals. This is where a the music is played up to the point where a difficulty 
arises whereupon that particular part is again broken down into component parts, repeated, and strung 
together again until it flows. Last is the performance rehearsal. This is similar to a LOFT event in that the 
entire piece of music is played, mistakes and all, in its entirety and examined later.  
Aviation’s success lies in the fact that many of the tasks and skills required are broken down and 
institutionalized in procedures. For the carrier pilot this takes place during the approximately 150 landings 
made in a dedicated training syllabus before the first carrier landing. The technique is similar to the 
technical rehearsal in that only a few skills are concentrated on during any particular event. Some skills 
such as flying the aircraft in reference to a specific angle of attack are similar to musician’s scales. Steady 
deliberate repetition is the order of the day. More complex skills are then added as the landing pattern 
altitudes are refined. Finally the subtleties of optics, flight physics, engine design, glide slope geometry, 
and wind are introduced to form a broad picture of the event that goes well beyond mere stick and rudder 
technique.  
In the case of both carrier flying and music, we can see that technical correctness alone is not enough, a 
broader context must also come into play. For the pilot flying onboard ship, for the safety analyst 
investigating an accident, and for the musician approaching a piece of music, technical skills are merely 
one set of tools for interpreting a larger canvas of relationships.  For this the musician enters a deep well 
of human factors and physics.  
If we are to consider human factors as anything that affects human performance, then music is the study 
of performance that affects humans. In both music and aviation, human factors strive to produce an 
intended result and both use known tendencies of cognitive psychology in the process. We start with the 
basics of breathing and discomfort. When two jet engines are not operating at near similar speeds the 
result is a kind of audio interference pattern. Most people would rather not have the oscillating noise 
drumming against their ears for extended periods of time.  Increase the frequency of that same audible 
pattern and speed and you have what is known in music as a dissident chord, equally tough to listen to, 
and either a compositional effect, or an indication that something’s not right.   
All sounds produce pitches that can be both heard and unheard. The unheard sounds are what are known 
as “overtones” in music and represent harmonic frequencies, much the same as they do in mechanics. 
There’s one catch however: the harmonics aren’t integers or perfect fractions. In fact if you take a 
frequency, say the 440 cycles per second of the concert note “A” and double it, you will indeed get an 
“A” an octave higher (this was a major discovery of Pythagoras).  If, however, you wish to create a pitch 
that will correspond to an appropriate dissonance with relation to that “A”, say a minor 7th, it will require 
a slightly different pitch than if you were simply to mathematically calculate where such a frequency 
should populate the spectrum of sound. Thus, if you are a professional concert pianist and you are to play 
Rachmaninoff’s concerto in C you would have your piano specifically tuned for that key. If, however, 
you want to tune your home piano once and be done with it, you would want to consider Bach’s “Well 
 
Tempered Clavier,” a set of music specifically designed for evenly tuned pianos that cleverly avoids 
chord combinations that highlight such a discrepancy.  
Fine you say, but Bruce Springsteen doesn’t care about this and what has all this to do with aviation 
anyway? The answer is Crew Resource Management. Before we get to that point let us look at one more 
aspect of music, phrasing. 
No matter how simple or complicated the music, it all has to do one thing and that’s to tell a story. Garth 
Brooks and Igor Stravinsky both have one thing in common: their music has the same basic phrase length 
of a human sentence. Perceptually we are so used to it we don’t even notice, but the affect on the 
mechanics of timekeeping are profound. The data in audio notation is similar to the data in an Flight Data 
Recorder plot in that it is all relative to a mathematical notation of time. As with our discussion about 
pitch, however, knowing when to “break the rules” is the stock and trade of the performer. You see when 
we speak, we subtly alter our rhythm so as to allow us to breathe, place emphasis, create an effect and so 
on. This also happens when we dance. The most difficult music for an orchestra to play well is a waltz 
because it’s lilting and slightly hesitating rhythm must be accomplished exactly by all members of an 
orchestra without specific, detailed direction from the conductor.  
A true professional musician normally spends years, usually nine to twelve including summer education, 
full time college, and graduate or advanced studies before his “mental model” of pitch, phrasing, along 
with physical technique allows him to truly ply his trade for a living. Then he will most likely do what 
pilots do; attempt to join a group of likeminded folks in producing some sort of desired output. For the 
pilot this will mean a multi-crewed passenger airline jet. For the musician it means an orchestra or some 
form of ensemble. While most of us are familiar with the image of the conductor, there is a large area of 
music that is played without one. These ensembles are known as “chamber groups” and can range from 
small orchestras to groups of three. It is here we start to notice how situational awareness and leadership 
are built and enacted.  
Situational awareness is the result of a shared mental model among groups of people. In a chamber group 
what is important is that such a model is expected to change and so are its leaders. Because how you 
perform depends on what your relationship is to a commonly shared awareness of  pitch structure (B flat 
for instance), as well as whether or not you or someone else is controlling the phrasing, your role as 
leader, supporter, or vitally important facilitator is relative to the current situation. As a result the chamber 
orchestra becomes skilled at rotating the roles of leadership in quite a fluid fashion. This does not mean 
there is not a dedicated leader responsible for the overall coordination of the activity,  merely that while it 
is taking place, there is a collective understanding that no single person can define all the requirements for 
a successful outcome.  
From an error management point of view the ramifications are obvious. Error is a fact of human 
performance both on stage and in the cockpit. The chamber orchestra however is more resilient to 
unexpected slips in performance because changes in leadership are a desired outcome of the group 
mentality and the mission training is more robust in that there is a greater appreciation for the roles each 
person plays and a recognition that how an outcome relates to others is more important than the individual 
effort.  
 
I want to stress again that this is no casual technique. All symphony orchestras are composed of 
“sections,” the violin section, the trombone section, the bass viola section, and so on. Each section has a 
designated leader that coordinates how the section should phrase and each section performs according to 
how their pitch lies in relation to the other pitches, rhythms, or melodies that can be involved at the same 
time. It is similar to how an airport operator, ATC facility, and flight crew operate; the only difference is 
that the musicians have been heavily trained to understand each other’s roles and how they relate to them.  
Compare this to the many examples of CRM breakdown seen in the accident databases. Even when 
looking at a basic safety management issue such as the un-stabilized approach we see that a fluid transfer 
of leadership based on commonly understood conditions runs into challenges. The reasons for this are 
both simple and elusive. The first and most obvious is training. We don’t train pilots in the underlying 
science of human cognition anywhere near to the extent that musicians do, but even if we did, the 
musician has one advantage we don’t, positive feedback. Even without an audience a group of musicians 
can get satisfaction from an exercise where situational awareness has been proficiently maintained 
because their recognition of success or failure is immediate. For purposes of safety success or failure is 
often viewed as how well exposure to risk has been managed. But while exposure to risk may be 
important to those in the safety office, it rarely has any connection with the satisfaction of accomplishing 
a successful mission of delivering passengers to their destination. While an on time arrival at a destination 
is easy to comprehend as a successful outcome, how much exposure to risk was amplified in the process 
can require some imagination.  
And so we find ourselves back to Apollo I and the question “what makes a hazard?” There are some 
things a musician doesn’t need to know that professional risk management does. As the musician needs to 
know phrasing, the safety professional needs to know rhetoric. Both disciplines deal with communicating 
relevance. As the musician needs to know the physics of sound, the safety professional needs to know 
about probability from Gaussian to Bayesian to the concepts of the “Black Swan” and the effects of the 
highly improbable. Both music and probability teach how to relate information. As the musician needs to 
know music theory and the differences between Gregorian chant and Wagner’s “Tristan chord” so the 
safety performer needs a thorough understanding of human factors. Both deal with how relationships 
between events can be viewed in different and unique ways.  
A “hazard” is really no more than a story presented to an audience that places in their mind’s eye a unique 
image of their world. Professionally trained and skilled musicians invest heavily in the many ways their 
world can present itself, how all those facets interrelate, and in how to effectively communicate that 
composition. Most important, however, is that music taps into our fundamental yearning to witness the 
economy of precision, that the image we are painting for others is exactly, to the finest subtlety, what we 
mean it to be.  
We finish with the comments of astronaut Frank Borman about a failure of imagination. If we start by 
looking at our safety information; our reports, our data, our investigations, and believe that they hold the 
answers to our questions than we miss an opportunity. If instead we take that information and ponder 
what questions we can ask about the data itself, what questions we should ask, and what questions would 
most likely lead to a change in our perception then we start down the process of changing our view of the 
world in new and unique ways. If we are surprised by what we find then we can re-assure ourselves that it 
is a view that won’t surprise us in the future.  
